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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 003140

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DEPARTMENT FOR AF/FO, AF/E, AF/RSA

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TAGS: [PREL](#) [MARR](#) [EAD](#) [SU](#) [ET](#) [EUN](#) [USEU](#) [BRUSSELS](#)

SUBJECT: DARFUR: EU STRESSES STRONG GOS ACTION AGAINST JINGAWAIT

REF: A. A) STATE 159301

[B. B\) SMALL-SCOTT E-MAIL OF 7/23/04](#)

[C. C\) ADDIS ABABA 2300 AND PREVIOUS](#)

[D. D\) BRUSSELS 3116](#)

Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR KYLE SCOTT. REASON: 1.4(B)
(D)

[11. \(C\) Summary and Action Request.](#) Hirep Solana's point man on Sudan, Christian Manahl, stressed the importance of improving the security situation in Darfur to allow humanitarian assistance. He ridiculed some of the GOS actions to date, and urged the arrest of Jingaweit leaders and suspension of GOS officials who have cooperated with them. EU continues to believe AU has all the funds it needs in short run until EU funds arrive, but said the AU staff backstopping the effort was hopelessly understaffed and creating a bottleneck for timely transfer of funds to the region. EU not certain of need for air surveillance in the region, and asks US views. End Summary and Action Request.

Need to Get Jingaweit Leaders "Out of Action"

[12. \(C\) Mission spoke July 23 with Christian Manahl, the official in Hirep Solana's Policy Unit tasked with Sudan, to relay ref A points and to compare notes on GOS compliance with its commitments \(ref B\).](#) Ref B points were also passed directly to CFSP Director General Robert Cooper. Manahl told us he is convinced the GOS can and should do more. The critical issue, in his view, is disarming the Jingaweit militia. So far, GOS steps have been insufficient. He said the arrests made were actually a ruse: the GOS has taken criminals already in GOS custody and declared them Jingaweit. Similarly, Manahl said the GOS was taking equally distasteful militia groups from Southern Sudan and placing them in Darfur as "policemen" -- a dangerous step more likely to exacerbate tensions than solve them.

[13. \(C\) The real test of GOS sincerity, Manahl argued, is whether they are prepared to arrest key Jingaweit leaders. These people need to be taken out of circulation immediately.](#) He said the list of top leaders the US has provided is basically right -- although the EU might consider one or two names questionable, and also believes other names should be added. Nonetheless, they should be arrested without delay. A second key step should be the suspension of GOS officials who have cooperated with the militia leaders. While acknowledging that the evidence may not exist to allow these officials to be tried for their activities at this time, suspension pending further investigation is the least the GOS could do. By getting militia leaders and their GOS supporters out of action, it should help eliminate the attacks, Manahl said.

The Situation on the Ground

[14. \(C\) The EU believes the problems of humanitarian access have been eased, but Manahl argued that sustained pressure is still required. Relaxed GOS regulations have made access somewhat easier, but if the security situation does not improve it will not matter what procedures are in place regarding access.](#)

[15. \(C\) EU understanding is that six monitoring teams should be fully deployed by Sunday \(with the possible exception of the team\).](#) Manahl supported the view we heard yesterday from Commission officials (ref D): the EU does not believe that cash-flow problems are a constraint on the AU in fielding teams. They have been assured that there is enough cash in the bank to keep the AU missions functioning for a few more weeks, allowing the time needed before the EC monies arrive. The real problem, according to Manahl, is in the AU secretariat, where crucial administrative backstopping is

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slow, causing the AU to have difficulties getting resources from Addis out to El Fasher. He cited in particular the staffing gaps in Amb. Ki Doulaye's operation, and called Ki Doulaye "a racist" for refusing to allow non-African additions to his staff to help facilitate operations. In

this regard, he noted that the EU would soon be sending a military operations liaison officer similar to the two US officials being attached to the AU effort.

Air Surveillance: Is It Needed? - Action Request

16. (C) Action Request: Manahl said missions in Khartoum were sending conflicting reports on the utility of air surveillance in Darfur. If air attacks had ceased, the need for air surveillance would appear to have been overcome. Manahl asked for US views in this regard.

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